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L INTRODUCTION 
The United States annually spends over $200 billion on 
cancer treatment and research.1 Over the past several 
decades, tremendous progress has been made in combating 
this disease. The five-year survival rate for cancer has 
increased from thirty-five percent in 1950-1954 to sixty-seven 
percent in 1996-2004. Moreover, over the last forty years, 
survival rates for childhood cancer have risen from twenty 
percent to eighty-one percent.2 However, the very success of 
new and improved therapies has created a host of problems 
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1. See NAT'L CANCER INST., THE NATION'S INVESTl\fENT IN CANCER 
RESEARCH: A PLAL'T AND BUDGET FOR FY2009 4 (2008), available at 
http://plan.cancer.gov/pdflnci_2009_plan.pdf (stating that the 2006 budget was 
$203.6 billion). 
2. NAT'L CANCER INST., SEER CANCER STATIS'l'ICS REVIEW 1975-2005, at 
31 tbl.I-3 (200S), available at 
http://seer.cancer.gov/csrI1975_2005/results_merged/sect_01_overview. pdf. 
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that were not previously considered. One of the results of the 
increased rate of post-cancer survival is the commensurate 
desire of former cancer patients to return to healthy lives, 
which for many includes having children.3 Unfortunately, for 
many this desire is difficult to fulfill, because the medication 
that succeeded in battling cancer is also quite often toxic to 
the reproductive organs.4 Thus, many people are able to live 
longer lives, yet feel that their lives are incomplete because 
they became infertile. 5 Whereas in the past fertility was not 
even part of the discussion when deciding on the proper 
treatment,6 now it is a top concern of many newly diagnosed 
cancer patients.7 
In response to this concern, medical researchers are 
investigating several approaches to preserve cancer patients' 
reproductive options.8 This new medical field has been 
christened "oncofertility," a portmanteau9 meant to connote 
the focus on both oncology and fertility preservation. 
In October 2007, the National Institutes of Health 
awarded a multi-million dollar grant10 to the Oncofertility 
Consortiumll to study and address the reproductive needs 
3. See Carrie Nieman et aI., Fertility Preservation and Adolescent Cancer 
Patients: Lessons from Adult Survivors of Childhood Cancer and Their Parents, 
in ONCOFERTHJTY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SURVIVORS 201, 208 
(Teresa K. Woodruff & Karrie Ann Snyder eds., 2007). 
4. See Teresa K. Woodruff, The Emergence of a New Interdiscipline: 
Oncofertility, in ONCOFERTIUTY: FERTIUTY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER 
SURVIVORS, supra note 3, at 3, 5. 
5. See Karrie Ann Snyder, Oncofertility and the Social Sciences, in 
ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CA;'<CER SURVIVORS, supra note 
3, at 137, 14l. 
6. See Nieman et aI., supra note 3, at 208 ("Most [cancer patients] did not 
remember discussing fertility with their physicians ...."). 
7. See Matthew J. Loscalzo & Karen L. Clark, The Psychological Context of 
Cancer-Related Infertility, in ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR 
CAc~CER SURVIVORS, supra note 3, at 180, 182-83. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. Lewis Carroll, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHA'r ALICE FOUND 
THERE 67 (University of California Press 1983) ("You see it's like a 
portmanteau-there are two meanings packed up into one word."). 
10. Nat'l lnets. of Health Grant No. U54RR024347 (2007), described in 
Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, NIH Launches 
Interdisciplinary Research Consortia (Sept. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/sep2007/od-06.htm. 
11. "The Oncofertility Consortium is a national, interdisciplinary initiative 
designed to explore the reproductive future of cancer survivors." The 
Oncofertility Consortium, About Us, http://oncofertility.northwestern.eduiabout­
us (last visited Dec. 20, 2008). 
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and choices of female cancer patients.12 Like many scientific 
breakthroughs, especially ones dealing with human 
reproduction, the Oncofertility Project enters an area of legal 
and ethical uncertainty.13 As the scientific and medical 
advances in the field of oncofertility are made, researchers, 
doctors, and patients need to be aware of hidden legal pitfalls 
and hazards. This article will pose some legal questions that 
are likely to arise in the field of oncofertility. Mter posing 
these questions, the article will apply now-existing legal 
principles in order to develop a framework for answering 
these questions. 
The article will begin its discussion by identifying the 
values at stake in the field of oncofertility. These values 
include the constitutional protection of the rights of women 
and minors to bear children and to use reproduction-assisting 
technologies, as well as the feminist critique of gendered 
expectations that may pressure women to use these 
technologies. 
Part III will focus on the medical options of oncofertility. 
It will also discuss some conditions that may lead otherwise 
fertile and young patients to lose their ability to bear children 
as a side-effect of necessary medical treatment. The article 
will then proceed to discuss briefly the current state of the art 
and the various medical options available to patients wishing 
to preserve fertility. 
Mter laying out both the medico-scientific and legal 
groundwork, the article will then address the potential legal 
questions that may emerge as the field of oncofertility 
develops. Can or must parents consent to a "medically 
unnecessary" surgery on behalf of a child to preserve her 
fertility? Who owns the excised tissue and the gametes 
contained within it? Additionally, legal issues that arise in 
conducting research on excised tissues for the purposes of 
future reproduction will be discussed. We avoid making 
definitive predictions of what the law relating to oncofertility 
will look like. Rather, our purpose is to suggest a framework 
based on the current state of the law which can help to 
answer these questions. 
12. See The Oncofertility Consortium, supra note II. 
13. The joined efforts of several institutions comprising the Oncofertility 
Consortium on medical, scientific, legal, economic, and other fronts, will be 
referred to here as the "Oncofertility Project." 
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II. WHAT IS AT STAKE? 
A. Is There a Right to Reproduce? 
The right to reproduce is firmly entrenched in American 
and internationallawY The United States Supreme Court 
has declared and reaffirmed the right to bear children in 
several decisions. For instance, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,15 the 
Court defined this right as "fundamental to the very existence 
of the [human] race."16 Subsequent cases involving the right 
to use contraceptives made clear that substantive due process 
guarantees the right to reproductive decision-making. In 
Griswold v. Connecticut,17 protecting married couples' right to 
use contraceptives, the Court described reproductive freedom 
as "older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political 
parties, older than our school system.... and intimate to the 
degree of being sacred."18 Similarly, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 19 
the Court extended this protection to unmarried people, 
holding that the right to privacy encompasses the "right of 
the individual, married or single, to" make his own decisions 
as to "whether to bear or beget a child."20 In a line of cases 
beginning with Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health,21 the Supreme Court held that minors, no less than 
adults, possess the right to decide whether to bear a child.22 
14. DOROTHY ROBERTS. KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION 
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 182 (1997) (noting that the right of privacy "is 
universally recognized to include the decision to bear a child," but criticizing the 
dominant view of reproductive liberty for failing to take social justice into 
account); JOFL.'\ A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVlij TECHNOLOGIES 131 (1994) (arguing that the right to procreate is 
constitutionally protected and extends to reproduction-assisting technologies). 
15. Skinner v. Ok!. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
16. Id. at 541. 
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
18. Id. at 486. 
19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 UB. 438 (1972). 
20. [d. at 453. 
21. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 
22. Id. at 522-23. In Akron, the Court held that a minor can decide on her 
own whether to undergo an abortion if she is sufficiently mature. [d. Casey and 
subsequent courts held to the same view. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). While upholding the requirement of parental 
consent, the Akron Court required a judicial bypass mechanism where a mature 
minor could demonstrate her maturity and decide the matter on her own. 
Akron, 497 U.S. at 510-11 ("[I]n order to prevent another person from having an 
absolute veto power over a minor's decision to have an abortion, a State must 
provide some sort of bypass procedure ifit elects to require parental consent.") 
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In addition to being firmly embedded in U.S. case law, 
the right to reproduce is also protected under international 
law. For instance, the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights proclaims that "[m1en and women of full age 
... have the right'to marry and to found a family."23 The 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights states that "[t]he right ... to found a family shall be 
recognized."24 The European Convention on Human Rights 
also adheres to this view.25 The Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam,26 adopted in response to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,27 states that "[t]he family is the 
foundation of society . . . ."28 Though coming to differing 
conclusions on the ultimate issue of the possession of frozen 
embryos, both the European Court for Human Rights and the 
Supreme Court of Israel held that a right to "become a 
parent" is a fundamental human right.29 In short, the right to 
have children is a nearly universally acknowledged and 
honored right.30 
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), art. 16(1), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. Al810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political art. 23(2), Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 179 ("The right of men and women of marriageable age to 
marry and to found a family shall be recognized."). The United States is a 
signatory to this Covenant, and has formally ratified it, though with some 
reservations. See 138 CONGo REc. S8068-71 (1992). 
25. European Convention for the Protection of Humau Rights aud 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 ("Men and 
women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family ... 
."). 
26. The Cairo Declaratiou on Human Rights in 5, 1990, World 
Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.157/PC/621Add.18 (June 9, 
1993) [hereinafter Cairo Declaration], available at http://wwwLumn.eduJ 
humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html. 
27. Some Muslim countries objected to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (the "UDHR") on the basis that in part it was not compatible with 
Sharia. David Littman, Universal Human Rights and "Human Rights in 
Islam," MIDSTREAM, Feb.-Mar. 1999, at 2, available at http:// 
www.dhimmitude.org/archive/universal_islam.html. The Cairo Declaration was 
adopted in response to such concerns. Id. 
28. Cairo Declaration, supra note 26, art. 5(a). 
29. CFH 2401195 Nahmani V. Nahmani, [1996] lsrSC 50(4) 661 (opinion of 
Dorner, J.) (English translation available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.illFiles_ENG/95/010/0241z01l9502401O.z01.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 1,2008»; Evans V. United Kingdom, 6339/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2007). 
30. To be sure, the right to bear children is not an unfettered one. Some 
courts have held that the state may limit a person's ability to reproduce in 
certain circumstances such as imprisonment or flagrant toward child 
support obligations. See, e.g., Gerber V. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) 
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Some of the fertility-preserving methods employed by the 
Oncofertility Project rely on scientific advances allowing for 
gametes to develop in vitro, rather than in ViVO. 31 These 
methods raise the question whether in vitro reproduction 
enjoys the same status as its much-older counterpart. While 
significant social and moral issues with respect to assisted 
reproductive technologies ("ART") arise,32 current case law 
and state statutes suggest that the constitutional protection 
of reproductive decision-making extends to individuals' use of 
these techniques in order to conceive. 
Would it be constitutional for a state to ban or severely 
restrict the use of ART? Although no court rulings explicitly 
recognize constitutional protection of a right to assisted 
reproduction, a review of court cases, statutes, and academic 
literature provides convincing evidence that U.s. law takes 
for granted that such a right exists. First, many state 
statutes recognize the legality of ART and support citizens' 
(en bane) (holding that prison inmates lose their right to reproduce); State v. 
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001) (upholding a condition of probation 
requiring a "dead beat" to avoid having another child). 
Some states (e.g., China) have imposed a limitation on the number of 
children individuals may have. Matt Rosenberg, China's One Child Policy: One 
Child Policy in China Designed to Limit Population Growth, ABOUT.COM, June 
18, 2008, http://geography.about.comlodipopulationgeography/a/onechiId.htm 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2008). However, such limitations are generally considered 
to be gross violations of human rights. For instance, a fear of forced abortion in 
China is grounds for an application for asylum in the United States. See Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIA"), 8 U.S.C. § 
1l01(a)(42)(B) (2006) ("For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a 
person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary 
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a 
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall 
be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person 
who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a 
procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall 
be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political 
opinion."). 
31. In vitro (literally, "within the glass") refers to performing a given 
experiment in a controlled environment outside of a living organism. See 
THOMAS L. STEDMAN, STEDl\1AN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 996 (28th ed. Lippincott 
Williams & Wilkins 2006). In vivo (literally, "within the living") refers to 
experimentation performed inside a living organism. See id. 
32. See ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: AN Al"THOLOGY (Helen 
Bequaert Holmes ed., 1992); DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How 
MONEY, SCIENCE AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006); 
Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the 
Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283 
(2007). 
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access to these services. For instance, an Illinois statute that 
regulated abortion and other procedures on embryos explicitly 
declared that "[n]othing in th[e statute] is intended to 
prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization."33 Louisiana 
has adopted statutes regulating in vitro fertilization ("IVF"),34 
and New Hampshire and Pennsylvania have statutes 
governing the obligations of sperm donors for IVF procedures, 
thus recognizing (at least implicitly) the right to use these 
technologies.35 The federal government also implicitly 
recognizes the legality of IVF treatments.3S In addition, 
"fourteen states currently require some types of health 
insurance plans to include coverage of certain infertility 
services or to make such coverage available."37 Thus, while 
no state explicitly protects a right to use IVF, both state and 
federal government implicitly acknowledge that such a right 
exists. These statutes also recognize, however, state and 
federal power to regulate assisted reproduction, and it 
remains unclear the extent to which the right to procreate 
limits such regulation. 
Second, court cases have similarly acknowledged a right 
to use ART. Several courts both in the United States and 
abroad have adjudicated disputes over ownership of fertilized 
frozen embryos. While the various courts came to differing 
conclusions, they all took the underlying right to access ART 
as a given. For instance, in Davis v. Davis, Tennessee's 
highest court implied-without explicitly holding-that the 
right to procreate by the means of IVF is within the ambit of 
33. 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 510/6 (West 2003). 
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2008) ("A 'human embryo' for the purposes 
of this Chapter is an in vitro fertilized human ovum ...."); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 5102 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). 
35. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (LexisNexis 2001) ("In vitro 
fertilization and preembryo transfer shall be performed in accordance with rules 
adopted by the department of health and human services ...."); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008) (requiring persons who provide 
IVF treatment to file certain reports with the Department of Health of the 
Commonwealth of Id. § 3216(c) ("Nor shall anything in this 
section be construed to condone or prohibit the performance of in vitro 
fertilization and transfer."). 
36. Fertility Clinic Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 
263a-1. (2006). 
37. JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: AsSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 8 (2007), available at http:// 
vlww.americanprogress.orglissuesl2007/12/pdflfuture_choices_section1.pdf. 
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the constitutional right to privacy.38 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court adopted the same reasoning in J.B. v. M.B.39 
The New York Court of Appeals, while not explicitly 
endorsing Davis, advised parties to IVF to enter into 
agreements on disposition of zygotes, thus treating ART as a 
legal means of reproduction and perhaps taking for granted 
its constitutional protection.40 
At the same time, some courts have placed limits on 
individuals' right to use ART. In In re Baby M, for example, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court voided as against public 
policy a surrogacy contract between the Sterns and the birth 
mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, when she decided to keep the 
babyY Thus, while the court implicitly acknowledged Mr. 
Stern's right to use IVF, it held that the constitutional right 
to reproduce did not encompass state enforcement of 
surrogacy contracts.42 Nor have courts held that the right to 
use ART includes a claim for state assistance to pay for these 
services. Louisiana and Nevada explicitly exempt health 
insurance plans from having to cover IVF in statutes that 
mandate coverage for other reproductive health services, and 
many states do not provide infertility treatment in their 
43public medical assistance programs. These limits on the 
right to access ART fit within the current U.S. Supreme 
Court interpretations of reproductive liberty as a negative 
right against state interference.44 In other words, while 
states are free to mandate insurance coverage of ART, the 
Constitution does not require it. 
38. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,600 (Tenn. 1992). 
39. See J.B. v M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715-16 (N.J. 2001). 
40. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); see also In re 
Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 
261 (Wash. 2002); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
41. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246-47 (N.J. 1988). 
42. See id. John Robertson argued that procreative liberty includes a 
constitutional right to state enforcement of surrogacy agreements. ROBERTSON, 
supra note 14, at 131-32. For a critique of Robertson's position, see Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Social Justice, Procreative Liberty and the Limits of Liberal Theory: 
Robertson's Children of Choice, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1005 (1995) (book review). 
43. See ARONS, supra note 37, at 8-10. 
44. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 231. Two federal appellate courts have 
rejected the claim that health plans that exclude infertility treatments violate 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 
ARONS, supra note 37, at 12-13 (citing Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Cent., 95 
F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 
2003)) . 
..... 
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Although the right to access ART, if one can afford it, is 
accepted by legislatures and courts, women's use of these 
technologies remains controversiaL On the one hand, some 
scholars see access to assisted reproduction as extending 
women's reproductive liberty. 45 Technologies that help 
women have children enhance the choices they have to fulfill 
their reproductive desires. In the context of oncofertility, it 
can also be argued that techniques that restore fertility to 
female cancer survivors place women on equal footing as men, 
who are easily able to store semen for future use. 
Oncofertility can be viewed as a gender equalizer that gives 
women and girls the same reproductive options as men and 
boys. On the other hand, feminists have long questioned the 
gendered forces that lead many women to use ART.46 They 
point out that women's desire to bear children is influenced 
by the stigma of infertility and the expectation that all 
women will become mothers. 47 Added to this is the desire to 
have a genetically related child. Some women feel a duty to 
undergo the expense and physical trauma entailed in IVF, 
rather than remaining childless or adopting a child, in order 
to be acceptable to a male partner and the wider society. 
Girls whose ovaries have been preserved may feel added 
pressure to become mothers because of the effort and expense 
that went into the procedure. Although many believe that 
access to ART is essential to reproductive freedom, others see 
it as reinforcing unjust expectations about women's 
reproductive roles. 
This review of statutes and court decisions shows that 
U.S. law currently acknowledges that procreative liberty 
encompasses, subject to some degree of state and judicial 
regulation, the right to use ART. Having established this, we 
now proceed to the discussion of unsettled legal issues that 
may affect the practice of oncofertility specialists, and thus 
the treatment options given to patients. 
45. See, e.g., REPRODUCTION, ETHICS AND THE LAW: FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995); ROBERTSON, supra note 14. 
46. See JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOlVmS: REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM (1993); BARBARA 
KA'l'Z ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: ImWLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A 
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989). 
47. See RAYMOND, supra note 46, at 5-6; ROTHMAN, supra note 46, at 29-33. 
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B. What Are the Reproductive Rights ofMinors? 
Generally speaking, minors have the same reproductive 
rights as adults, except that states have greater power to 
regulate the conduct of minors. In Bellotti v. Baird, the 
Supreme Court held that a requirement of parental consent to 
abortion, without a judicial bypass prOVISlOn, was 
unconstitutionaL Although the Court subsequently has been 
more solicitous of legislative attempts to interpose adult 
involvement in the minor's abortion decisions,48 it has never 
allowed any state to legislate a scheme under which a minor's 
decision could be vetoed by a parent (unless such a "veto" is 
also sustained by an impartial judge).49 Additionally, most 
states permit minors to use contraceptives without seeking 
adult permission. 50 
With respect to deciding to bear a child (as opposed to 
deciding to terminate a pregnancy), minors' rights are even 
broader. The age of consent in many states is well below the 
age of majority (especially when both participants are 
minors).51 No state permits any third party to require a 
minor to get an abortion should the minor become pregnant. 
In other words, if a minor decides to bear the child, the 
decision is hers alone. Finally, as discussed below, parents 
cannot deprive minors of future reproductive capacity, absent 
compelling need and a court order. 52 In short, a minor's 
liberty to determine his or her own reproductive future is 
48. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 
(1992) (upholding parental notification requirement); Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 326 (2006) ("States unquestionably have the right to 
require parental involvement when a minor considers terminating her 
pregnancy, because of their 'strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of 
[their] young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment 
may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely.' » (quoting 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1990»). 
49. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 ("[AJ State may require a minor seeking an 
abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an 
adequate judicial bypass procedure. "). 
50. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & mST. CODE § 14503 (West 2001); 325 ILL. COMPo 
STAT. A.N"N. lOll (West 2001); see also Carey V. Population Servs., Int'I., 431 U.S. 
678 (1977) (overturning state statute prohibiting those under sixteen from 
accessing contraception). 
51. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16·6·3 (1994 & Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE A.'rx. 
§ 97-3·65 (1972 & Supp. 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (West 2000 & 
Supp. 2008). All of these statutes define the age of consent for the purposes of 
sexual relations, and all set it lower than eighteen. 
52. See infra Part IV.B. 
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constitutionally protected from restraint except in narrow 
circumstances that are subject to judicial review. Minors 
enjoy the same constitutional protection of their reproductive 
rights as adults, even if exercising some of these rights (due 
to the limitations of biology) is deferred until they mature. 
III. WHAT ARE THE MEDICAL OPTIONS? 
As medical advances are made in cancer therapies and as 
the number of cancer survivors increases, 53 new challenges 
arise beyond defeating cancer itself. One of these significant 
challenges is the negative impact that cancer treatments may 
often have on reproductive function in young adults and 
children. Life-preserving treatments such as chemotherapy 
and radiation threaten fertility, leading to immediate 
infertility in some cases and subfertility in others, the latter 
resulting in a lower sperm count in men and accelerated loss 
of follicles in women.54 Additionally, patients with 
autoimmune disease are often treated with similar alkylating 
chemotherapy that can affect their fertility.55 In an attempt 
to meet the urgent needs of these patients, the new field of 
oncofertility has been created to unifY two essential 
disciplines-oncology and fertility-and to explore more 
fertility-sparing treatments, as well as expand on current 
assisted reproductive technologies focused on these patients. 
There are currently a handful of options available to 
newly diagnosed cancer patients, including more traditional 
options as well as novel assisted reproductive technologies. 
The traditional options include both third-party reproduction 
and adoption. Third-party reproduction consists of gamete 
donation and/or uterine surrogacy for cancer patients whose 
therapies diminished these functions. Domestic and 
international adoptions are additional alternatives, though a 
53. See Ahmedin Jemal et al., Cancer Statistics, 2007, 57 CA CANCER J. 
CLIN. 43, 48 (2007) (noting decrease in cancer death rates); Murat Sonmezer & 
Kutluk Oktay, Fertility Preservation in Female Patients, 10 HUM. REPROD. 
UPDATE 251, 251 (2004). 
54. See Sonmezer & Oktay, supra note 53, at 252; Robert E. Brannigan, 
Fertility Preservation in Adult Male Cancer Patients, in ONCOFERTILITY: 
FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SURVIVORS, supra note 3, at 28-42. 
55. See G.E. Katsifis & A.G. Tzioufas, Ovarian Failure in Systemic Lupus 
Erythematosus Patients Treated with Pulsed Intravenous Cyclophosphamide, 13 
LUPUS 673, 673 (2004) (noting ovarian failure as a side-effect of lupus 
treatment); Sonmezer & Oktay, supra note 53, at 254. 
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patient's cancer diagnosis might be a hindrance to a 
successful adoption. 56 These options are valuable means of 
forming a family, yet they fail to fulfill the desire of many 
women to reproduce genetically related offspring. 
In response to its high demand, ART has progressed 
tremendously over the last three decades, providing new ways 
of conserving fertility. For men and pubertal boys, feasible 
options for fertility preservation already exist. One such 
option is semen cryopreservation, where semen samples are 
provided by patients and frozen for later use. Intrauterine 
insemination and/or intracystoplasmic sperm injection 
("ICSI") can then be used to conceive with relatively high 
success rates-one sperm alone may be sufficient to fertilize 
an oocyte and result in pregnancy.57 If the cancer patient is 
unable to obtain a semen sample via ejaculatory methods, a 
surgical biopsy can be performed and mature sperm procured 
from the sample.58 These options for men and pubertal boys 
can be provided immediately, permitting the patient to return 
to treatment soon thereafter. Options for prepubertal boys 
are on the horizon, and will require a testis biopsy and 
59storage of the biopsied tissue for later use. Because sperm 
represent a ready source of mature gametes that are 
available in large numbers and can be cryopreserved easily, 
the primary concern of a male patient is to be navigated to an 
appropriate sperm bank in a timely manner. 
For women facing a cancer diagnosis, various fertility­
preserving procedures are also available, though they are 
more limited than those mentioned for men. Currently, the 
most well-established option is to undergo ovarian 
60stimulation for maturation and retrieval of the eggs. The 
eggs may be fertilized by selected sperm donors or 
cryopreserved. In both cases, the individual must delay 
cancer treatment during the time of hormonal induction. 
56. See Allison Rosen, Third-Party Reproduction and Adoption in Cancer 
Patients, 34 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS 91, 92 (2005) (noting barriers 
faced by cancer patients and survivors in both domestic and international 
adoption). 
57. Brannigan, supra note 53, at 42. 
58. ld. 
59. ld. at 45. 
60. Sanjay K. Agarwal & R. Jeffrey Chang, Fertility Management for Women 
with Cancer, in ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER 
SURVIVORS, supra note 3, at 15, 20. 
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Neither pubertal nor prepubertal girls are eligible for 
ovulatory induction procedures. An additional developing 
technology is ovarian tissue cryopreservation, where cortical 
tissue strips are obtained and reimplanted at the time of 
remission.61 Because ovarian follicles are present in the 
ovary of women from the time of birth,62 ovarian tissue can be 
recovered from prepubertal, pubertal, and adult women. The 
number of follicles diminishes rapidly with age;63 thus, tissue 
cryopreservation is more amenable to younger patients. For 
female patients undergoing radiation, surgical ovarian 
transposition can be done prior to therapy to remove the 
ovaries from the field of impact.64 
Although these technologies exist for women, they have 
significant limitations that exist beyond mere research 
obstacles. Many of the techniques that are most frequently 
utilized, including embryo and oocyte cryopreservation 
require hormonal stimulation for oocyte retrieval. This is 
inevitably problematic for several reasons. First, cancer 
treatment must be delayed when undergoing any of these 
stimulation-dependent procedures. In many cases, however, 
it is imperative that a patient begin treatment immediately 
after a cancer diagnosis, and the option of withholding 
treatment for an extended period of time is simply 
nonexistent. Another major concern regarding ovarian 
stimulation is the reaction it might elicit from hormonally 
responsive cancers, including certain types of breast and 
ovarian cancers.65 A third limitation of these therapies is that 
hormonal stimulation is only permitted for young women, 
excluding girls younger than eighteen-years-old. As a result, 
this cohort of cancer patients has limited options available to 
them. An additional limitation of embryo cryopreservation is 
the need for sperm, requiring either a partner or use of a 
sperm donor. Furthermore, tissue transplantation carries a 
theoretical and potentially real-depending on the cancer­
61. Id. at 22. 
62. Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: 
Social Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 270 (1999). 
63. See ARTHUR C. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 899 (8th 
ed.1991). 
64. Sonmezer & Oktay, supra note 53, at 258. 
65. Id. at 253. 
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concern of seeding metastatic disease. 66 
In the quest to meet the urgent needs of many cancer 
patients facing fertility-threatening treatment, the field of 
oncofertility has set out to find novel methods to improve the 
awareness of providers and the public, develop rapid response 
systems and easy navigation tools, and, finally, to develop 
new modalities that will preserve fertility at the time of 
diagnosis. Significant progress has been made in each of 
these areas. One of the most important aspects of the work is 
the development of in vitro follicle maturation, which is 
envisioned to provide utility to tissue that is cryopreserved at 
the time of cancer diagnosis and which will not incur the 
downstream risk of the reintroduction of cancer. This 
technique utilizes cryopreserved ovarian tissue to recover 
immature follicles, which can be grown to produce mature 
oocytes available for IVF. While in vitro follicle maturation is 
still experimental, it has resulted in successful animal births 
and is currently being explored in human tissue.67 If 
successful in humans, in vitro follicle maturation could 
become a new alternative for young patients-including 
prepubertal girls-for whom hormonal stimulation and 
embryo production is not an option. 
Amid the hope and opportunities that scientific success of 
in vitro follicle maturation could bring, many legal and 
ethical implications of this new technology will arise. First, 
one must consider the implications of ovarian tissue removal, 
and the significance of removing an organ. Guidelines and 
laws will have to be created in order to clarify the value and 
ownership of such tissue and the legal limits of acquisition 
and disposition in adults and minors. This is especially 
important in a setting where the death of a patient is a 
significant possibility, and where ownership of the deceased's 
tissue may therefore be contested. Additional precautions 
will need to be taken owing to the nature of this tissue, which 
is not merely a body part, but one that holds the potential of 
producing offspring, highlighting the heavy consequences this 
66. [d. at 258. 
67. See Evelyn E. Telfer et al., A Two-Step Serum-Free Culture System 
Supports Development of Human Oocytes from Primordial Follicles in the 
Presence of Activin, 23 HUM. REPROD. 1151, 1155 (2008) (reporting success of 
growing human follicles from cortical strips); Min Xu et aL, Tissue-Engineered 
Follicles Produce Live, Fertile Offspring, 12 TISSUE ENGINEERING 2739 (2006). 
..... 

---
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type of research could have. This article provides a means of 
initiating discussion and an opportunity to create much­
needed social, moral, and legal guidelines that should 
accompany this area of research. 
IV. THE LEGAL & MORAL QUESTIONS 
A. Who Can Consent to a Medical Procedure and What Are 
the Limits? 
As with any other medical procedure, the patient must 
freely and voluntarily consent to the ovarian tissue 
cryopreservation in order for that protocol to be legally68 (and 
morally)69 employed. Any medical manipulation of the 
patient without such consent, under our laws and traditions, 
constitutes battery (even if medically beneficial to the 
patient).70 
Generally speaking, a competent adult can consent to 
almost any legal medical procedure,71 including one that will 
permanently alter his or her reproductive capacities.72 Thus, 
adults are free to consent to tubal ligation or vasectomies,73 
even though these procedures are most often irreversible, 74 
68. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971) ("It is clear and 
appellees concede that . . . the hospital authorities would have no right to 
impose compulsory medical treatment against the patient's will and indeed, to 
do so would constitute a common law assault and battery."). 
69. See Gregory Dolin, A Healer or an Executioner? The Proper Role of a 
Psychiatrist in a Criminal Justice System, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 205-07 (2002) 
(arguing that patients' consent is sine qua non of ethical medical practice). 
70. See Winters, 446 F.2d at 68. 
71. See Sehloendorff v. Soe'y of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) 
(opinion by Cardozo, J.) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind 
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body ...."). 
72. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2974 (2005) ("It shall be lawful for any 
physician licensed by the Board of Medicine to perform a vasectomy, 
salpingectomy, or other surgical sexual sterilization procedure on any person 
eighteen years of age or older, who has the capacity to give informed consent, 
when so requested in writing by such person."); GA. CODE ANN. § 31·20·2 (1994) 
("It shall be lawful for any physician to perform a sterilization procedure upon a 
person 18 years of age or over, or less than 18 years of age if legally married, 
provided that a request in writing is made by such person and provided, further, 
that prior to or at the time of such request a full and reasonable medical 
explanation is given by such physician to such person as to the meaning and 
consequence of such operation."). 
73. See supra note 72. 
74. See WILLIAM GANONG, The Gonads: Development & Function of the 
Reproductive System, in REVIEW OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 411, 428 (22d ed. The 
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and thus will permanently limit reproductive capacity ot the 
patient. Conversely, as discussed below, competent adults 
can consent to procedures that will preserve or enhance their 
reproductive capacities. Thus, when the oncofertility patient 
is a competent adult, she can legally and ethically decide for 
herself whether or not she wants to undergo an invasive 
procedure in hopes of preserving future reproductive 
capacity.75 
Consent, while a sine qua non of ethical medical practice, 
is not the only consideration. The first principle of medicine 
is "first, do no harm."76 In other words, the physician ought 
not perform procedures or prescribe treatment that carries 
risks, but no identifiable benefits.77 This does not mean that 
experimental treatments are out ofbounds,78 but, rather, that 
prior to asking for the patient's consent, physicians must 
assure themselves that the treatment offered carries more 
potential medical benefits than harms.79 
With respect to minors, the question of consent becomes 
more complicated. In most circumstances, parents (or legal 
McGraw-Hill Companies 2005); Cecilia K. Wieslander et aL, Therapeutic 
Gynecologic Procedures, in CURRENT DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT: OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 796, 804 (Alan H. DeCherney et aL eds., 10th ed. 2007). 
75. 'I'o be sure, such a decision may not be an uncomplicated (or even, in 
some cases, a completely rational) one. The patient will most likely be under 
tremendous stress from the just-received, difficult diagnosis, and will likely be 
focused mostly on preserving her life first and foremost, rather than on a 
somewhat ancillary issue of fertility preservation. Yet, despite the difficulty of 
the choice, as a legal matter, and as an ethical matter, the choice rests with the 
patient as an autonomous being, with her own human dignity. 
76. The Hippocratic Oath-Classical Version, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh! 
novaldoctorsloath3lassical.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2008) ("I will apply 
dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and 
judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice."). 
77. Linda Farber Post, Unblinded Mandatory HN Screening of Newborns: 
Care or Coercion? 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 169, 203 n.211 (1994) ("Following the 
axiom 'first do no harm,' public health and preventive medicine experts 
generally consider that preventive interventions should be of proven efficacy 
and effectiveness."). 
78. See Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy 
Through Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL'y 1051, 1070 (2007) 
("Physicians value safety higher than effectiveness: in their perspective, futile 
treatments can be scrapped and supplanted in a trial-and-error effort ...."). 
79. An experimental treatment carries a potential medical benefit in a sense 
that there are sound scientific bases to believe that it may work. It is then the 
patient's job to assign relative weight to the potential benefits as well as 
potential harm that may result from treatment. See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 69, 
at 204-05. 
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guardians) are invested with legal authority to make medical 
decisions for their minor offspring and generally can choose 
when, whether, and from whom to seek care for their minor 
children.80 This discretion is given to parents for good reason. 
As the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research observed: 
[A] family member ought usually to be designated as 
surrogate to make health care decisions for an 
incapacitated patient in consultation with the physician 
and other health care professionals: 
(1) The family is generally most concerned about the 
good of the patient. 
(2) The family will also usually be most 
knowledgeable about the patient's goals, preferences, 
and values. 
(3) The family deserves recognition as an important 
social unit that ought to be treated, within limits, as 
a responsible decisionmaker in matters that 
intimately affect its members. 
(4) Especially in a society in which many other 
traditional forms of community have eroded, 
participation in a family is often an important 
dimension of personal fulfillment. 
(5) Since a protected sphere of privacy and autonomy 
is required for the flourishing of this interpersonal 
union, institutions and the state should be reluctant 
to intrude, particularly regarding matters that are 
personal and on which there is-. [sic] a wide range of 
opinion in society.81 
80. See, e.g., In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013 (N.Y. 1979) ("[G]reat 
deference must be accorded a parent's choice as to the mode of medical 
treatment to be undertaken and the physician selected to administer the 
same."). There are exceptions to this rule. See infra notes 84-85. Parents 
cannot refuse treatments such as blood transfusions, and may not 
deprive their children of medical attention when such deprivation is 
tantamount to child abuse. See infra notes 84-85. However, with respect to 
routine procedures, the choice lies with the parents. See Hofbauer, 393 N.E. 2d 
at 1014 (holding that after consulting with trained physicians, parents can 
choose whatever course of action any accredited provider recommends). 
81. MORRIS B. ABRAM ET AL., PRESIDENTS COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING 
TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, 
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The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
similarly notes that "family members and loved ones" are 
usually "in a position to know best the patient's wishes."82 In 
addition to these moral and ethical observations, American 
courts have held that parents have a constitutional right to 
bring up children as they deem best without interference by 
the state, absent a compelling state interest to the contrary.83 
The parent's right to decide on a child's treatment is not 
absolute. Unlike a competent adult who can choose to reject 
any treatment for any or no reason, a parent cannot reject a 
medically necessary treatment on behalf of his child. 
Parental decisions regarding medical treatment are limited 
by the principle that parents must act in the best interest of 
the child. 84 Thus, for instance, a parent may not decline a 
blood transfusion on behalf of his child, even if both the child 
and the parent hold religious views that prohibit blood 
transfusions. 85 Similarly, parents cannot consent to enroll a 
MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 127-28 (1983). 
82. U. S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS 
DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 1 (4th ed. 2001), 
http://www.usccb.orgibishops/directives.shtml. 
83. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that parents 
have a constitutional right to deny visitation opportunities to third parties); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that parents have a right to 
decline to educate their children past eighth grade when such compulsory 
education conflicts with parental religious beliefs); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a state cannot prevent parents from sending their 
children to parochial schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding 
that the parents have a constitutional right to teach their children a foreign 
language). 
84. See, e.g., In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1987) (" 'Several 
relevant factors must be taken into consideration before a state insists upon 
medical treatment rejected by the parents.' . .. [Tlhe juvenile court is vested 
with a 'very extensive discretion in determining what will be in the best 
interests of a child ... .' ") (internal citations omitted); Newmark v. Williams, 
588 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Del. 1990) ("This Court must therefore substitute its own 
objective judgment to determine what is in Colin's 'best interests.' "); In re 
Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1390 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) ("Douglas and Lori 
Willmann may, under the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the state of Ohio, be free to deny themselves whatever medical 
care they choose, but it does not, and cannot here, follow that they are free to 
impose that denial upon David."). 
85. Jehovah's Witnesses of Wash. v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 
504 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (holding that parents have no constitutional right to 
deny blood transfusion to minors); In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Mass. 
1991) (affirming an order authorizing blood transfusion to treat leukemia 
overall parental religious objections); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1119 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989) (affirming an order permitting blood transfusion to treat sickle 
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child in clinical research "unless it is intended to promote the 
health of the population represented by the potential subject, 
[and] the research cannot instead be performed with 
competent persons."86 Furthermore, parents are limited in 
their ability to consent even to experimental treatment of the 
minor by two considerations. "First, if the treatment is not 
medically necessary for the minor, it must not be 
unreasonably harmful. Second, the treatment must be to the 
benefit of the minor, and not just to the benefit of the minor's 
parents or other family members."87 These limitations are 
not surprising if one keeps in mind the overarching 
requirement that in deciding on the course of treatment, 
parents must act in the child's best interest. 88 
In addition to obtaining parental consent, it is often 
useful to seek the child's input into the treatment decision. 
First, such input may carry legal weight.89 Second, 
[sleeking the assent of a minor who is not legally 
authorized to consent demonstrates respect for the 
decision-making skills of a nonautonomous individual to 
the extent that he or she is able to participate in the 
decision. This is particularly relevant for adolescents who 
cell anemia over parental religious objections). 
86. WORLD MED. ASS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH 
INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 4 'II 27 (1964), available at 
http://www.wma.netie/policy/pdfl17c.pdf. 
87. Kishka-Kamari Ford, "First, Do No Harm"-The Fiction of Legal 
Parental Consent to Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 
YALE L. & POL'y REV. 469, 481 (2001); see also Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 
123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that procedures done on the minor even with 
parental consent constitute battery if not done for the benefit of the minor 
child). 
88. When there is room for a legitimate difference of opinion as to which 
treatment is best, the state defers to the parental choice. See, e.g., Hofbauer, 
393 N.E.2d at 1014 (holding that parents may choose any treatment that has 
been "recommended by their physician and which has not been totally rejected 
by all responsible medical authority"). Parents are, however, precluded from 
choosing a treatment that has no identifiable benefits to the minor. See supra 
note 87 and accompanying text. 
89. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1990) (holding that the minor 
can refuse blood transfusions); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) 
(" '[AJ minor acquires capacity to consent to different kinds of invasions and 
conduct at different stages of his development.' ") (internal citations omitted); 
Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 836 (W. Va. 1992) 
(holding that unemancipated minors may nonetheless be legally able to consent 
to procedures depending" 'upon the age, ability, experience, education, training, 
and degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the minor' " (quoting Cardwell 
v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748 (Tenn. 1987))). 
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are cognitively mature but below the age of legal majority 
and still dependent upon adults for their basic health care 
decisions.90 
Third, seeking minor's assent may be a prerequisite to 
administering the treatment effectively because it ensures 
that the patient is compliant.91 
Thus, when dealing with pediatric patients the simple 
formula of " 'efficacy of treatment' plus 'patient's consent' 
equals 'administering the treatment' " does not hold. In 
pediatric cases, in addition to assuring themselves of the 
treatment's benefits, physicians must also make sure that 
they seek parental consent, and the child's assent (where 
practicable). These considerations ultimately are subject to a 
judicial determination of the best interests of the child.92 
B. Are There Limitations to Proxy Consent in the 
Reproductive Context? 
As the above discussion demonstrates, although parents 
are generally permitted to make medical decisions for their 
minor children, these decisions must be in the best interests 
of the child. 93 In the area of sexual health and reproduction, 
parents' decisional rights are further limited. For instance, 
courts have held on numerous occasions that parents cannot 
veto a minor's decision to seek an abortion.94 Numerous 
90. Soc'y for Adolescent Med., Confidential Healthcare for Adolescents: 
Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, 21 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 408, 409 (1997); see also Am. Acad. Pediatrics, Comm. on Bioethics, 
Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 
PEDIATRICS 314, 316 (1995) ("There are clinical situations in which a persistent 
refusal to assent (i.e., dissent) may be ethically binding."). 
91. Cf. Emmanuel Jaunay et a!., Treatment Refusal in Adolescents with 
Severe Chronic Illness and Borderline Personality Disorder, 15 J. CAN. ACAD. 
CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 135, 136 (2006) (discussing how a number of 
factors, including "poor parent-child communication and a strained relationship 
with the treating physician," increase non-compliance with treatment). 
92. Doctors of course caunot unilaterally decide to ignore the wishes of the 
parents and determine for themselves what is in the child's "best interests." To 
the extent that there are disagreements between the physicians and the 
parents, such disagreements are resolved by the courts. See, e.g., In re 
Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1011 (allowing parents to, after court review, choose 
treatment for their child against the primary doctor's recommendations); cf In 
re Eric B., 189235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1987) (noting that it is the "state," 
rather than a doctor, that has an interest in child's well being and therefore can 
act to protect those interests). 
93. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
94. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 510 U.S. 1309 (1992); 
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states have also enacted legislation that allows a minor to 
seek treatment (or preventative measures) for pregnancy95 
and sexually transmitted disease without parental 
involvement or consent.96 There are weighty reasons why 
reproductive decisions are excluded from otherwise nearly 
plenary parental authority to make medical decisions on 
behalf of their offspring. First, because decisions that affect 
the reproductive capacities of minors necessarily interfere 
with "one of the basic civil rights of man,"97 they must be 
heavily scrutinized and sometimes disregarded. Second, it 
may be more likely that parental involvement in a minor's 
decisions on such sensitive issues as sexual activity and 
pregnancy will not serve a minor's best interest.98 
In exploring the limits of parental authority over 
reproductive and sexual health decisions of minors, it is 
useful to look at the jurisprudence governing four 
procedures-male circumcision, female genital cutting, sex 
assignment surgery, and sterilization. All four are elective 
procedures,99 but all are not treated in the same way by the 
legal system. Looking at the differences in the leeway 
permitted to parents in each of those circumstances, and the 
underlying reasons for those differences, can help in 
constructing a framework within which questions about the 
legal treatment of oncofertility can be answered. 
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (CaL 1997); N. Fla. Women's 
Health & Counseling Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003); Planned 
Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Attorney 677 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 
1997). 
95. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Ethics of Pediatric Research, 
57 DUKE L.J. 517, 547 n.118 (2007). 
96. Id. 
97. See Skinner v. Okl. ex reI. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
98. See Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile 
Custodial Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1300 
(2004) ("In cases where parents hold strong views on subjects such as abortion, 
minors, especially those dependent on parental support, are influenced by their 
parents' wishes, even when those wishes may not be in the minors' best 
interest.") . 
99. See Melissa W. Kaufman et al., Neonatal Circumcision: Benefits, Risks, 
and Family Teaching, 26 AM. J. MATERN. CHILD NURS. 197, 197 (2001) (stating 
that reasons for circumcision are often "religious, cultural, . . . or parental 
choice"). In some cases, male circumcision may be medically necessary, but 
those constitute a minority of all circumcisions performed in this country. Id. at 
197-99 (noting that percent of all males in the United States are 
circumcised at birth, and that only 0.6% of all boys suffer from phimosis 
(inability of foreskin to retract)). 
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1. Male Circumcision 
Male circumcision involves removal of the foreskin of the 
penis. 100 It is a procedure usually performed on a newborn 
child,101 sometimes for religious or cultural reasons. 102 
Following World War II, the practice of circumcision became 
quite common in the United States.103 Parents routinely 
consent to the procedure and it is routinely performed. 104 
Lately, however, the practice started drawing criticism as 
being incompatible with the child's right to bodily integrity 
and autonomy.105 In 1999, the American Academy of 
Pediatrics106 issued its position statement on circumcision, 
recommending that doctors should not routinely advise 
parents to seek circumcision of their sons, but should, at the 
same time, yield to parental request for the surgery. 107 
Despite the increased criticism, male circumcision remains 
legal. 
For instance, in a 2008 case involving a dispute between 
divorced parents over the decision to circumcise a minor male 
child, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the custodial 
parent has legal authority "to make medical decisions for his 
or her child, including decisions involving elective procedures 
and decisions that may involve medical risks."108 The court 
explicitly noted that "although circumcision is an invasive 
medical procedure that results in permanent physical 
alteration of a body part and has attendant medical risks, the 
decision to have a male child circumcised for medical or 
100. Id. at 197. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See Joel C. Hutcheson, Male Neonatal Circumcision: Indications, 
Controversies and Complications, 31 UROLOGIC CLINICS N. AM. 461,461 (2004). 
104. See id. 
105. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Circumcision: Cultural-Legal Analysis, 9 VA. J. 
SOC. POL'y & L. 497, 551-80 (2002) (discussing the "anti-circumcision 
movement"); see also Adam Liptak, Opponents of Circumcision Use the Legal 
System and Legislatures to Combat It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,2003, at A14. 
106. American Academy of Pediatrics is "an organization of 60,000 
pediatricians committed to the attainment of optimal physical, mental, and 
social health and well-being for all infants, children, adolescents, and young 
adults." Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, About AAP, http://www.aap.org/about.html 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2008). 
107. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Circumcision Policy Statement, 103 PEDIATRICS 
686, 686 (2003), available at 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgilcontentlabstractl103/3/686. 
108. In re Marriage of Boldt, 176 P.3d 388, 393 (Or. 2008) (emphasis added). 
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religious reasons is one that is commonly and historically 
made by parents in the United States."109 The court did limit 
parental authority somewhat by directing the trial court to 
examine the views of the minor (twelve-years-old at the time) 
and take them into account.ll0 
In State v. Baxter,l11 the Washington Court of Appeals 
noted that "ritual circumcisions . . . have been performed for 
thousands of years and have never been held contrary to 
public policy."112 Courts in other states, in addressing various 
claims of medical malpractice and improper informed consent 
for the circumcision procedure, have uniformly assumed that 
a properly performed circumcision after a proper informed 
consent by one of the parents is fully consistent with the 
lawY3 
2. Female Genital Cutting 
By contrast, consider a procedure performed on minor 
females commonly referred to as "female circumcision" or 
"female genital cutting," which involves "partial or total 
removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the 
female genital organs for non-medical reasons."114 Like male 
circumcision it may be performed for religious or cultural 
reasons, and like male circumcision it is "an ancient cultural 
or social custom."1l5 Unlike male circumcision, however, 
female genital cutting is universally viewed (in the American 
legal system) as a procedure to which parents cannot legally 
consent. 
For instance, in 1996, Congress passed the 
Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act, which 
makes it a crime to perform the procedure on a minor.ne In 
109. Id. at 394. 
110. Id. 
111. State v. Baxter, 141 P.3d 92 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
112. Id. at 98 added). 
113. See, e.g., Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, 895 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1995) 
(assuming, in context of malpractice action, that a properly consented 
circumcision is permissible); Wilson v. Lockwood, 711 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1986); Flatt v. Kantak, 687 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 2004). 
114. World Health Org., Female Genital Mutilation, 
http://www.who.intitopics/female_genitaLmutilation/en/ (last visited Dec. 21, 
2008) (emphasis added). 
115. People v. Sanchez, 800 N.E.2d 455, 462 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
116. Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 116 
(2000). The statute provides that (subject to certain medical necessity 
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enacting the statute, Congress found that "the practice of 
female genital mutilation often results in the occurrence of 
physical and psychological health effects that harm the 
women involved."l17 This fmding is supported by the 
statement of the World Health Organization on this issue.1l8 
A number of states have enacted similar prohibitions of the 
practice.119 Thus, unlike male circumcision, which 
generally considered to be a safe procedure with some 
possible medical benefits,120 the female genital cutting is 
viewed in this country as both non-beneficial and harmful. 121 
3. Sex Assignment Surgery 
A third case of elective sexual surgery is sex assignment 
surgery performed on minors. Studies show that nearly one 
out of every two-thousand children born in the United States 
is born with ambiguous genitalia.122 An estimated one to two 
hundred pediatric sex assignment surgeries are performed 
each year.123 The sexual assignment surgeries for children 
with ambiguous genitalia became an accepted standard of 
care in the 1970s.124 Most of these children underwent 
surgeries to create external female genitalia,125 and were 
exceptions) "whoever knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or 
any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person who 
has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than 5 years, or both." ld. Note, however, that an adult can consent 
to this procedure for herself. This is in line with the general rule that an adult 
can consent to virtually any legal medical treatment or procedure. See supra 
note 71 and accompanying text. 
117. Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 645, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006». 
118. See supra note 114. 
119. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.4 (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 780 (2008); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/12-34 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., HEALT-GEN. 
§ 20-601 (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2245 (West 2003); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 130.85 (McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-36-01 (1997); 
R.L GEN. LAws § 11-5-2(c)(3) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-110 (2002); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 146.35 (West 2006). 
120. See Kaufman, supra note 99, at 197. 
121. See supra notes 117-18. 
122. Kenneth Kipnis & Milton Diamond, Pediatric Ethics and the Surgical 
Assignment ofSex, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 398, 401 (1998). 
123. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical 
Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with 
Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 17 (2000). 
124. ld. at 3. 
125. External female genitalia are easier to fashion than external male 
ld. 
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raised as girls.126 Since the surgeries were performed on 
minor children, parents were the ones consenting to the 
procedure. Although there have been no definitive court 
decisions, in 1996 the American Academy of Pediatrics 
supported the idea of elective sex assignment surgery and 
recommended that it occur before the age of two-and-a-half 
127years.
In the last decade, serious concerns have been raised 
about the efficacy of the sex assignment surgeries and the 
consequences such surgeries have on the patients.128 For 
instance, cases have been reported where the children who 
had sex-assignment surgery grew up unhappy with and 
confused about their assigned gender, and with psychological 
problems stemming from these feelings. 129 The discovery of 
these harms, and the realization that sex-assignment surgery 
forecloses the "[c]hild's [r]ight to an [o]pen [f]uture,"130 has led 
some experts and advocates to question the morality of 
parents consenting to sex-assignment surgery without any 
input by the children themselves. l31 Nonetheless, the current 
standard of practice in the medical profession is to permit, 
and even to encourage, parents to quickly decide whether to 
assign a specific sex to a child with ambiguous genitalia.132 In 
the absence of statutes or court decisions to the contrary, this 
remains a legal practice, even though it permanently 
determines a child's sexual identity and the way the child will 
lead his or her life. 133 
4. Sterilization 
A final case to consider IS the parental decision to 
126. Id. 
127. AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, Timing ofElective Surgery on the Genitalia of 
Male Children with Particular Reference to the Risks, Benefits, and 
Psychological Effects of Surgery and Anesthesia, 97 PEDIATRICS 590, 590 (1996), 
available at http://aappolicy.aappublications.orglcgilreprintlpediatrics;97/41 
590.pdf. 
128. Beh & Diamond, supra note 123, at 23-27. 
129. See id. at 6-7. 
130. Id. at 57. 
131. See id. at 34. 
132. See id. at 43-44. 
133. To be sure, once grOVlll, the child can attempt to reverse the surgery. 
But even if successful in that attempt, the prior surgery has still permanently 
affected the way the child grew up, learned to socialize, and developed 
relationships. See id. at 11. 
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sterilize a child. Some parents wish to sterilize a daughter 
who is severely developmentally or mentally disabled because 
they believe that child bearing is not in the daughter's best 
interest, in part because she is unlikely to be able to care for 
her child, or perhaps even to understand the nature of 
pregnancy and childbirth.134 Nonetheless, in most states, 
parents cannot make this decision on their own, even if the 
medical professionals agree with and recommend this course 
of action.135 Instead, most states require an independent 
judicial determination of the best interest of the child sought 
to be sterilized. 136 The courts and legislatures have viewed 
sterilization "as an extraordinary measure which is to be 
decided by a court and undertaken only pursuant to court 
order."137 That is so because "[c]onsent by parents to the 
sterilization of their mentally retarded offspring has a history 
of abuse which indicates that parents, at least in this limited 
context, cannot be presumed to have an identity of interest 
with their children."138 Generally, courts also require that 
there be "clear and convincing evidence"139-a very high 
standard14°-showing that sterilization is in the child's best 
134. See In re AW., 637 P.2d 366, 367-68 (Colo. 1981) (discussing the 
reasons advanced by parents in their petition to sterilize their "severely 
retarded" twelve-year-old daughter). 
135. See Kathleen M. Boozang, CAM for Kids, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'y 
109, 123 (2001) ("tAJ court order is typically obtained before an incompetent 
minor is sterilized ...."); Christine Muckle, Comment, a Voice to 
Intersex Individuals through Hospital Ethics Committees, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
987, 1000-01 (2006) ("[11n some situations-such as parental decisions 
regarding sterilization, organ donation, and persistent vegetative state ("PVS") 
conditions-courts have questioned the parent's ability to competently consent 
because of the inherent gravity of the situation and the possibility of a conflict 
of interest between the parent and the child. In these situations, it is not 
necessarily that the parents are prohibited from making health care decisions 
for their children, only that competency is not assumed. Thus, parents are not 
given the same level of deference that they would normally receive."). 
136. See supra note 135. 
137. Mich. Protection & Advocacy Servo v. Kirkendall, 841 F. Supp. 796, 801 
(E.D. Mich. 1993). 
138. In re A.W., 637 P.2d at 370 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
139. See, e.g., Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hosp., Inc., 447 A2d 1244, 
1254 (Md. 1982); In re Terwilliger, 450 A2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); In 
re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635,640 (Wash. 1980). 
140. See Bryant M. Bennett, Comment, Evidence: Clear and Convincing 
Proof' Appellate Review, 32 CAL. L. REV. 74, 75 (1944) ("Where clear and 
convincing proof is required, the proponent must convince the jury or judge, as 
the case may be, that it is highly probable that the facts which he asserts are 
true."). 
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interests and that it is the least intrusive method of 
controlling the child's reproduction. 141 
5. Variations in Parental Consent Requirements 
A common thread runs through the four situations just 
reviewed. It appears that the parental right to consent to 
surgery involving reproductive or sexual organs is highest 
when the procedure has identifiable (even if controversial) 
medical benefit and does not threaten the health or future 
reproductive choices of the child. Additionally, historical 
traditions as well as contemporary cultural and professional 
value judgments play a significant role in the acceptance or 
rejection of these procedures. Thus, parents are given 
virtually unfettered authority to consent to male circumcision 
because there are identifiable142 (though hotly debated) 143 
medical benefits to the procedure and because the procedure 
has been part of the Western tradition for close to 5000 
144years. Similarly, parents can consent to sex assignment 
surgery because the mainstream medical profession believes 
this surgery is necessary for a child's normal psychological 
and emotional development,145 despite contradictory evidence 
from recent studies. 146 This perceived medical benefit is tied 
to dominant U.S. social norms which dictate that individuals 
must have unambiguous external genitalia and sexual 
identities.147 
On the opposite side of the legal spectrum, female genital 
cutting is considered to offer no medical benefit of any kind, 148 
is foreign to Western traditions,149 and carries a high medical 
141. See In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 806 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). 
142. See Kaufman, supra note 99, at 198-99. 
143. Id. 
144. Miller, supra note 105, at 512. 
145. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 123, at 40 (noting that sex assignment 
surgeries are viewed as beneficial by the medical community and as a result 
have not drawn much judicial scrutiny). 
146. Id. at 23-27. 
147. See generally Alissa Quart, When Girls Will Be Boys, N.Y. TIMES, March 
16, 2008, at MM32 (discussing difficulties faced by transgender individuals in 
terms of societal acceptance); Deborah Young, On the Frontier of Transgender 
Civil Rights, TIMES·PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 20, 2008 at DIB. 
148. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. 
149. See Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to 
the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from Their Infant 
Children?: The Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 113 (1999) ("Unlike male circumcision, the practice 
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risk to the subject.150 Thus, parents are flatly prohibited from 
consenting to this procedure. The decision to sterilize an 
incompetent girl lies somewhere in between. Although the 
procedure arguably provides medical benefits by preventing a 
possibly harmful pregnancy,151 sterilization runs counter to 
asserted U.S. traditions that encourage reproduction and 
individual liberty. It also conjures up the sordid history of 
compelled sterilization of "feeble minded" and disabled 
persons during the eugenics era, which was discredited after 
World War II.152 Thus, a parents' request for sterilization is 
subject to approval by an independent judge. 
C. How Does Current Law on Proxy Consent Apply to 
Oncofertility? 
The legal treatment of parental consent regarding the 
four elective surgeries discussed above can be used to create a 
framework for analyzing parental consent in the context of 
ovarian tissue cryopreservation.153 
The first consideration is the age of a child. If the child is 
still a minor but of an age at which she can comprehend some 
issues about future reproduction, she should be consulted. As 
the Oregon Supreme Court noted in In re Marriage of Boldt, 
at a certain age, decisions dealing with permanent alterations 
of the body may affect the relationship between the child and 
parent and could have a "pronounced effect on [parents'] 
capability to properly care for" the child.154 Furthermore, 
other courts have recognized that mature (though not 
emancipated) minors, can participate in decisions about their 
healthcare, even the decision is contrary to the commonly 
accepted medical practice.155 Additionally, and as described 
of female genital mutilation (".I<'GM") is deemed barbaric by western cultures."}. 
150. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
151. For instance, preventing a pregnancy that the minor may not be able to 
handle either physically or psychologically can be considered a medical benefit. 
See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
152. See DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE 
USES Q)i' HUMAN HEREDI'l'Y (1985); PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: 
A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN TIIE UNITED STATES (1991). 
153. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 123, at 41 (listing three criteria 
ethicists consider when deciding on appropriateness of consent by proxy). 
154. In re Marriage of Boldt, 176 P.3d 388, 394 (Or. 2008). 
155. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (IlL 1990) (holding that a mature 
minor can refuse blood transfusions); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748 
(Tenn. 1987); Jerry Markon, Fight over a Child's Care Ends in Compromise; Va. 
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above, courts and legislatures have long permitted minors to 
make decisions involving reproduction or sexual health with a 
reduced level of parental control over those decisions. 156 
Thus, in our view, to the extent possible, the views of the 
child must be solicited and, though not dispositive, be given 
due weight. 
The second issue to be taken into account is the question 
of how much sexual function is likely to be retained post­
surgery. For instance, if the procedure involves the removal 
of only one ovary, with the other remaining in place and being 
counted on to provide proper hormonal balance in the later 
years, there may be less concern than in cases where both 
ovaries are to be excised or in cases in which the ovary to be 
excised is the only healthy one. In the former cases, the risk 
to the patient is rather small, and the change in natural 
unassisted reproductive and ancillary sex functions is 
similarly small (though appreciable).157 In the latter cases, on 
the other hand, the chance of losing unassisted function is 
certain,158 and the child will need perpetual hormone 
replacement therapy.159 In a situation such as this, a very 
careful balance must be made between the uncertain 
potential for future offspring versus the real and definite 
consequences of losing an organ that provides proper 
hormonal balance-and perhaps also reproductive function. 
The third consideration is the size of the putative benefit 
of undergoing the chosen oncofertility procedure. It is worth 
remembering that at this stage the science of ovarian tissue 
removal for the purposes of future reproduction is at its 
infancy. No live births in humans have yet been reported 
following excision of an ovary and subsequent in vitro follicle 
maturation and fertilization. 160 However, live births in 
Judge's Order Could Have Forced Teen to Get Cherrwtherapy, WASH. POST, Aug. 
17, 2006, at Al (discussiug a settlemeut between a minor child and the 
Department of Sodal Services allowiug the minor to forego traditional cancer 
treatmeut in favor of an alternate regimen). 
156. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
157. Amir Lass, The Fertility Potential of Women with a Single Ovary, 5 
HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 546, 549 (1999). 
158. David Lee, Ovarian Tissue Cryopreservation and Transplantation: 
Banking Reproductive Potential for the Future, in ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY 
PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SlJRVIVORS, supra note 3, 110, 110. 
159. Id. 
160. See Sonmezer & Oktay, supra note 53, at 260. However, studies on mice 
have resulted in live births. See Xu et aI., supra note 67, at 2739. 
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humans have been reported following excision of an ovary 
from tissue transplants and in vitro maturation of available 
161mature eggs. Thus, with regard to the preservation of 
human fertility, the protocol in question is at the early 
experimental stages.162 Importantly, since patients who are 
five- or six-years-old today will not be in a position to have 
children for another fifteen to twenty years, it may well be 
that by then, the oocyte maturation process will be well 
established and will result in a level of success not below that 
which is expected for "regular" IVF protocols.163 Nonetheless, 
it must be recognized that at the present day, successful 
preservation of reproductive ability via ovarian tissue 
removal and storage is still under development. 
The last issue to consider is the purpose of the parent's 
decision to subject the child to the ovarian tissue removaL To 
the extent that the parental decision is purely about 
preserving the child's future options, it is likely to be more 
acceptable to the legislatures, the courts, and the general 
public. As discussed above, much turns on whether the 
proposed medical procedure fits within U.S. social traditions 
and norms. 164 Because the ability to reproduce is generally 
valued in U.S. society and is protected by the Constitution, 165 
preserving reproductive options is likely to be considered 
highly beneficiaL In fact, the primary critique of the 
procedures discussed above is that they ignore "the [c]hild's 
[r]ight to an [o]pen [f1uture."166 Oncofertility procedures can 
be seen as preserving this right. 
It can also be argued, however, that parents who seek 
161. See, e.g., Isabelle Demeestere et al., Fertility Preservation: Successful 
Transplantation of Cryopreserved Ovarian Tissue in a Young Patient Previously 
Treated for Hodgkin's Disease, 12 ONCOLOGIST 1437 (2007); J. Donnez et aI., 
Livebirth after Orthotopic Transplantation of Cryopreserved Ovarian Tissue, 
364 LANCET 1405 (2004); Dror Meirow et al., Pregnancy after Transplantation of 
Cryopreserved Ovarian Tissue in a Patient with Ovarian Failure after 
Chemotherapy, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 318 (2005); Sherman J. Silber et a1., 
Ovarian Transplantation between Monozygotic Twins Discordant for Premature 
Ovarian Failure, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 58 (2005). 
162. See Xu et al., supra note 67; Telfer et aI., supra note 67, at 1155. 
163. While no definitive answer can be given to the question of when and if 
this project will come to fruition, given the current level of success in the 
laboratory, it is not unreasonable to believe that success in humans can be seen 
within five to ten years. 
164. See supra Part IV.B. 
165. See supra Part II. 
166. Beh & Diamond, supra note 123, at 57. 
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this procedure for their daughters are steering the child's 
future decisions toward child bearing. Undergoing ovary 
removal as a child and preserving her ovarian tissue for a 
number of years may put enormous pressure on a woman to 
use the stored tissue. It provides a powerful reminder 
throughout the rest of her childhood and early adulthood of 
parental and societal expectations that she should one day 
bear children. Nonetheless, even if parental choices end up 
influencing the future choices of minors, such influence is 
legally permissible, as can be evidenced from a variety of 
decisions upholding parental rights to raise their children in 
a manner they deem appropriate. 167 
On the other hand, consider the situation where the child 
has very little hope of recovery, yet the parents still wish to 
subject her to the ovarian tissue removal procedure in the 
hope of having a genetic grandchild from their soon-to-be­
deceased child. When analyzed within the above-suggested 
framework, this hypothetical leads to a different result. In 
this situation, it cannot be fairly said that parents are 
preserving reproductive capacity and decisions that the child 
can exercise upon reaching the age of majority. The parents 
are preserving their own option of having a grandchild, but 
not their child's options (since the child is not likely to 
survive). In these circumstances, a court might decide that 
the parents are not acting in the best interest of the child, but 
are subjecting her to unnecessary medical procedures that 
carry no benefit either now or in the future. 
D. Is Failing to Preserve Fertility the Same as Active 
Sterilization? 
The reverse side of the question of whether parents can 
consent to the ovarian tissue cryopreservation is the question 
of whether they must consent to it. Do parents have a duty to 
preserve their child's fertility if ovarian tissue 
cryopreservation is available? Do children have a right to the 
procedure even if their parents do not wish to consent to it? 
Although we cannot at this stage give any definitive answers, 
we will explore parents' potential legal obligations and 
outline the issues that ought to be taken into consideration 
when resolving these questions. 
167. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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As discussed previously, parents are generally given wide 
latitude in deciding what constitutes appropriate medical 
treatment for their offspring. However, that latitude is 
circumscribed by the requirement that parents act in the best 
interest of the child consistent with not only the family's 
values and morals, but also with good medical practice and 
with "society's basic values." 
The premise underlying parents' right to consent to 
ovarian tissue cryopreservation is that the procedure 
preserves the "basic" societal value of reproductive choice. It 
can be argued that children for whom parents give consent 
will be in a better-if not exclusive-position to exercise this 
choice compared to children whose parents did not consent. 168 
According to this view, parents who choose not to consent are 
depriving their child of her right to reproduce. In other 
words, it can be argued that parents' refusal to consent to a 
viable ovarian tissue cryopreservation is, in effect, no 
different. than the parents' decision to sterilize their child-a 
decision that parents are not permitted to make without 
judicial approval. Sterilization involves active medical 
intervention, however, whereas declining to consent to the 
ovarian tissue cryopreservation is passive non-interference. 
Whether this makes a difference in the legal outcome depends 
on a judgment about the moral equivalency of action and 
inaction in these cases. 169 That calculus may be affected by 
the eventual degree of success of ovarian cryopreservation. 
In contemplating what the correct answer to the above 
dilemma should be, it is useful to weigh the factors discussed 
in the preceding section-the balance of medical risks and 
benefits, the societal acceptance of the practice, the effect on 
the child's "open future," and the success rate of the 
treatmentpo 
To the extent that the minor in question can rationally 
168. This would happen assuming that a way to consistently mature oocytes 
from excised prepubescent ovaries will be found. Should that never happen, 
excision of ovaries would be an unnecessary surgery and thus by definition, not 
"good medical practice." Of course, in this situation, the question described in 
the preceding section will arise again, i.e., should parents be allowed to consent 
to a procedure that does not provide any foreseeable medical benefit? In other 
words, the question presented in this section and the one presented in the 
previous section are simply two sides of the same coin. 
169. See AM. MED. AsS'N, POLICY COMPENDIUM 87 'll E-2.20 (1997). 
170. See supra Part IV.C. 
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consider her options and express her preferences accordingly, 
that should mostly be the end of the matter. Courts and 
legislatures routinely defer to mature minors' decisions on 
reproductive matters. Indeed, courts occasionally defer to 
minors even on life and death matters if the minor's decision 
is in accord with that of the parents, and if the minor is 
sufficiently mature.l7l It stands to reason then, that if minors 
can choose to terminate or to continue with pregnancy, their 
wishes will most likely be similarly honored with respect to 
the decision to preserve future fertility.I72 Of course, this 
"easy" solution does not obtain when the minor is unable to 
rationally consider the various choices and come to an 
informed decision. Thus, the remaining two factors need to 
be considered. 
First, the surgical risk of excising an ovary minimaL 
In most cases, the procedure can be performed 
laparascopically.173 Although certain risks of infection and 
error are present, it is no greater than risk associated with 
any other surgical procedure (e.g., tonsillectomy). The low 
risk of the procedure, coupled with the low burden that it 
imposes on the minor, then militates toward the position that 
the procedure ought to be performed. On the other hand, the 
risk of being left without the ovary is significant. As 
discussed previously, loss of an ovary alters the hormonal 
balance and reduces the chances of in vivo pregnancy. This 
very real risk counsels against performing the procedure. 
Second, presently, the success rate of ovarian 
cryopreservation is speculative at best. But even if it were to 
171. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. 
172. It may be argued that the decision to abort a pregnancy does not 
necessarily permanently change the child's future life, while the decision not to 
preserve fertility does permanently change future options. We would respond 
that while the premise may be true, it is equally true that the decision not to 
abort does permanently change the young mother's future options in life. Yet, 
both decisions to abort and not to abort are equally honored when made by 
mature minors. We believe that decisions of a mature minor about preservation 
of fertility would be similarly honored. 
173. "Laparoscopy describes a group of operations performed with the aid of a 
camera placed in the abdomen." Medline Plus, Medical Encyclopedia: 
Laparoscopy, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007016.htm (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2008). "The risk of intraoperative and postoperative 
complications, hospitalization time, and the cost of treatment are generally 
much less with laparoscopic surgery than with traditional open procedures." 
THOMAS L. STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1047-48 (28th ed. 
Li.ppincott Williams & Wilkins 2006). 
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become as successful as established IVF procedures, the 
success rate would still be quite 10w.174 If the ovarian tissue 
cryopreservation rises to the same level of success as IVF, it 
will no doubt be a tremendous achievement and a huge leap 
forward in terms of reproductive options available to young 
women stricken with cancer. That said, a thirty percent level 
of success may be insufficient to definitively require parents 
to take one or another course of action.175 On the other hand, 
if the ovarian tissue cryopreservation achieves significantly 
higher success rates (e.g., eighty to ninety percent), a much 
stronger case could be made that depriving the child of an 
opportunity to decide for herself whether or not to bear 
children later in life is violative ofthe child's best interest and 
ought not be permitted. 
The three factors outlined above, however, are not 
exhaustive, for they do not take into account individual 
family values that the parents hold and are likely to impart 
to their child. Parents are entitled to take their values into 
account in making medical decisions for their children. 
Moreover, the parents may place a higher priority on their 
child's current health than on their child's ability to become 
pregnant in the future. They may also oppose the use of 
reproduction-assisting technologies for religious, ethical, or 
cultural reasons. There is no doubt that the values imparted 
during the child's upbringing playa large role in the child's 
own decisions during adult Hfe.176 Thus, for example, a child 
may grow up in a family that opposes procreation and instead 
supports adoption (because, say, they believe that the world is 
overpopulated). In that hypothetical family, the ability to 
reproduce in the future would not be particularly valued. 
174. As a reference point, nationwide, the success rate of IVF treatment was 
around thirty percent. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 19 (2006) (stating that 
the birth rate per successful retrieval procedure is 31.6% and falls to 27.7% if 
one counts the women who started the IVF treatment, but whose eggs could not 
be collected). 
175. It bears remembering that taking out an ovary of necessity decreases 
the ability to "naturally" conceive. Thus, to trade-off a certain 
reduction of that ability in exchange for a thirty percent success rate of some in 
vitro procedure is a rational choice. 
176. Thus, for instance, children of Republicans are more likely to remain 
Republicans as grown-ups, while children of Democrats are more likely to 
remain Democrats. Robert C. Luskin et aI., Issues and the Transmission of 
Partisanship, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 440, 440 (1989). 
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Because this value is likely to be imparted on the child (who, 
given the hypothetical, would likely have been adopted), it is 
more likely than not that once grown, the child will not place 
a great premium on the ability to reproduce. 
It is no answer to say that th~ ovarian tissue 
cryopreservation simply preserves choice and does not 
actually force anyone to reproduce should they not want to. 
Subjecting the child to these medical procedures carries 
certain finite risks. It also is potentially distracting from the 
major issue facing the family-saving that child's life. Thus, 
the protocol is neither cost- nor risk-free. And the benefit 
that the protocol provides for the child of the hypothetical 
parents described above is, at best, questionable. Thus, 
deeply held family values should also be seriously considered 
and taken into account in deciding whether parental 
decisions not to consent are subject to judicial override. 
The balance of factors, then, at present, counsels against 
disregarding parental wishes to forego ovarian tissue 
cryopreservation. However, as we stated in the beginning of 
this subsection, we cannot, with any confidence, predict how 
courts and legislatures will respond to this dilemma should it 
ever arise. By outlining this potential dilemma and 
discussing the factors that are likely to influence the answers, 
we are hoping to provide practitioners, patients, and the 
public a framework for the discussion of these questions. 
E. Who Controls the Fate ofthe Excised Tissue While the 
Patient Is Alive? 
Once the gametes (whether sperm or ova) are harvested 
and stored (in whatever form) there is a question as to who 
controls the usage of this stored material. In cases of adults, 
the answer is clear. The control resides with the progenitor 
herself. The right to control the fate of one's gametes, 
whether these gametes are intra- or extra-corporeal, is firmly 
established in the law. As the Tennessee Supreme Court held 
in Davis, "the existence of the right [of procreational 
autonomy] itself dictates that decisional authority rests in the 
gamete-providers alone."177 Thus, a clinic cannot do anything 
with the stored gametes to which the progenitor has not 
agreed. 
177. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992) (emphasis added). 
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Children are at a disadvantage in this situation because 
they may not be able to express their wishes as to any 
disposition of the stored gametes, and to the extent that they 
are able to express them, such expression may not be legally 
binding while the children are minors. Nonetheless, we are of 
the view that the only people who should have the authority 
to decide the disposition are the children themselves, when 
they reach the age of majority. We come to this conclusion for 
several reasons. 
First, the very premise of oncofertility treatment 
(whatever form it may take) is to preserve the patient's 
choices on whether or not to have children. 178 Any decision by 
the guardian to donate or otherwise dispose of the child's 
gametes would vitiate the child's ability to make future 
choices. Thus, the initial procedure to preserve gametes 
would become useless, and therefore, in retrospect, would be 
improper, since it would serve no medical purpose 
whatsoever. Second, it is well established that children are 
not proper sources for organ or tissue donation. 179 Thus, 
parents should not be able to donate the child's gametes, just 
like they cannot donate a child's kidney or blood. Third, the 
parents' decisions with respect to the minors' medical 
treatment are limited by the requirement that the parents act 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9. 
179. See Francis L. Delmonico & William E. Harmon, The Use ofa Mirwr as a 
Live Kidney Donor, 2 ML J. TRANSPLANTATION 333, 333 (2002) ("[Tlhe 
Consensus Conference participants were generally opposed to live organ 
donation from a minor because it obviously strains the concept of voluntarism, 
the ethical underpinning of live donation."). There is a narrow exception 
for intra-family donations by minors when such a donation necessary to save 
the life of another family member. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 
(Ky. 1969) (holding parents may consent to a donation from one minor brother 
to another because the death of one brother is likely to impact the 
other one); see also Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Corm. Super. Ct. 1972) 
(holding that parents may consent to intra-twin kidney donation); Little v. 
Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Tex. App. 1979) (authorizing a transplant from a 
minor incompetent donor after concluding that the donor "will receive 
substantial psychological benefits" from the donation). But see Curran v. Bosze, 
566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (refusing to authorize testing for bone marrow 
compatibility from a minor half-sibling of the afflicted patient); In re 
Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that kidney donation by 
a minor to a sibling is not in minor's best interest and therefore prohibited). 
Even blood donation by minors is limited. See AM. MED. CEJA REP. 3-I­
93: THE USE OF MINORS AS ORGAN AND TISSUE DONORS (1993), available 
at http://www.ama-assn.org/amallpub/uploadlmm!369/ceja_3i93.pdf. 
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in the best interest of the minor.18o When parents choose to 
dispose of minors' gametes, it is hard to see how they are 
acting in the minors' best interest. At best, such a decision 
neither advances nor detracts from minors' interests, and at 
worst, it runs directly contrary to those interests. 
Finally, as we discussed above, parents are not 
permitted, without good cause and court approval, to forcibly 
sterilize their children. 181 It seems to us that the prohibition 
applies whether the child's reproductive capacity is inside or 
outside the body. Any decision by the child's guardian that 
would destroy or significantly limit a child's existing 
reproductive capacity cannot be honored without the court's 
consent. Moreover, permitting someone other than the child 
to decide would create a dangerous risk of exploitation. For 
these reasons, we believe that once gametes are stored, the 
only person who can dictate their ultimate disposition is the 
donor. In those cases where the donor is a minor, the 
gametes must be stored until such time as the minor can 
legally direct their use or disposition. 
F. Who Controls the Fate ofthe Excised Tissue When the 
Patient Is Dead? 
A more perplexing question regarding the ownership of 
excised and stored tissue arises if the patient dies. As 
discussed above, while the donor is alive, there is no question 
that she retains ownership of her tissue (unless she donated 
it to someone else) and that she can dispose of it as she 
wishes. The sad fact, however, is that far from all oncological 
patients win their battle with cancer. Once the patient dies, 
who should decide the disposition of the tissue that she left 
behind? 
The Northwestern University Oncofertility Project 
presently employs a consent form where the patient agrees 
that, should she die, the tissue will be destroyed or donated to 
research. Needless to say, these options are not the only 
possible ones, nor are they likely to be acceptable to all 
patients. This is especially true when the patient herself is 
legally and/or mentally incapable of consent. There is, 
unfortunately, no American case law that directly governs the 
180. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra Part N.B. 
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disposition of gametes after the donor's death. Several cases 
involving stored sperm have considered the wishes expressed 
by the deceased donor during the course of his life.182 For 
example, in Hecht v. Superior Court, the California Court of 
Appeal decided a dispute between the decedent's adult 
children and his surviving girlfriend over the ownership of 
the decedent's sperm.183 The court held for the girlfriend 
because the decedent's will, along with other actions he took 
during his lifetime, clearly expressed the desire that the 
frozen sperm pass to his girlfriend.184 The Hecht court ruled 
that" 'the seed of life . . . [is] tied to the fundamental liberty 
of a human being to conceive or not to conceive.' . .. [T]he 
fate of the sperm must be decided by the person from whom it 
is drawn. Therefore, the sole issue becomes that of intent."185 
These cases provide little guidance here because minor 
children are often incapable of expressing or even forming 
intent as to the future use of their gametes. Very young 
children simply do not (and cannot) know whether or not they 
would want children, let alone whether they wish to have 
post-mortem children. This inability to express any intent is 
especially acute in young female patients. As we have 
discussed, male patients are not candidates for gamete 
storage until the age of puberty.18B At that time, while they 
may not be able to fully appreciate the full meaning of 
fatherhood, at least they are able to express some preference 
about having children. Female patients, on the other hand, 
are candidates for gamete preservation at any time from birth 
187on. Even newborn girls could theoretically be candidates 
for ovarian tissue removal and preservation. It is impossible 
to decide the disposition of tissue based on the intent of 
children too young to form or express an intent about 
childbearing. A different way of determining the disposition 
of the gametes must therefore be found. 
There are three basic ways in which parents may wish to 
182. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993); Estate of 
Kieveruagel, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1024 (Ct. App. 2008); cf Kurchner v. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 858 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding 
(relying on Hecht) that frozen sperm is to be treated like personal property). 
183. Hecht, 20 CaL Rptr. 2d 275. 
184. Id. at 289. 
185. Id. at 288 (emphasis added) (interual citations omitted). 
186. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
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dispose of the ovarian tissue of a deceased daughter: it can be 
destroyed, donated for research,188 or kept by relatives189 for 
the purpose of having the decedent's child. It seems to us 
that either of the first two options is not problematic from the 
viewpoint of law or ethics. If the parents decide to destroy 
the tissue, it is really no different than deciding to bury their 
child's body without preserving any of her tissue-a decision 
countless parents make every day. Similarly, if the parents 
decide to donate the tissue to research, it is no different than 
deciding to donate their child's body or organs for research­
again, a decision that many parents currently make. 
The third option, on the other hand, raises serious 
concerns. Although no American court has directly addressed 
the question of disposition of a decedent's genetic material 
absent clear expression of the decedent's intent, two French 
courts have done so. In Mme. O. c. CECOS,190 the wife's eggs 
were fertilized with her husband's sperm and stored.191 The 
husband died prior to implantation of the embryos and the 
wife requested that the embryos be implanted after his 
death.192 The consent form that the husband and wife signed 
prior to storing the embryos was silent on the question of 
disposition in cases of death or divorce. 193 The High Court at 
Rennes, France, held that, absent proof that the husband 
intended his wife to be sole decision-maker with respect to the 
future of the embryos, the wife had no authority to 
unilaterally decide on implantation, whether pre- or post­
death.194 The case of Mme. P. c. La Grave Hopita[195 was 
similar to Mme. 0., except for the fact that the consent form 
signed by the husband and wife explicitly stated that consent 
188. Tissue cannot be donated for transplantation with cancer patients 
because the risk of cancer re-seeding is too high. See Sonmezer & Oktey, supra 
note 53, at 258; see also supra text accompanying note 65. 
189. "Relatives" here is broadly defined to include blood relatives, relatives 
by marriage, and significant others who may not have been married to the 
decedent, but maintained a committed sexual relationship. 
190. Tribunal de grande instance [T.GJ.] [ordinary court of original 
jurisdiction] Rennes, June 30, 1993, J.C.P. 1994, II, 22250, 169, note Neirinck 
(Fr.). 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Cour d'appel [CAl [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, Apr. 18, 1994, 
J.C.P. 1995, II, 224072, 301, note Neirinck (Fr.). 
712 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:49 
of both parties is necessary for implantation.196 After the 
husband's death, the court upheld the agreement even though 
the husband's consent was no longer obtainable, thus 
declining to permit Mme. P. to proceed with implantation.197 
As in Hecht, both French cases held that the intent of the 
progenitor is of paramount importance and is to be honored. 
Where the donor expressed no clear intent to become a 
parent, however, the courts will not infer it, even if the donor 
is deceased. 
There is heated academic debate on the proper 
disposition of a decedent's genetic material. Although the 
debate focuses on the genetic materials that were stored by 
adult individuals (since childhood storage is a very new 
possibility), much of the logic can be applied to the problem of 
the disposition of stored genetic material of minors. For 
instance, John Robertson argues that "directions for or 
against posthumous reproduction deserve much less respect 
than decisions about reproduction when one is alive,"198 thus 
concluding that the surviving relatives ought to control the 
disposition of the decedent's genetic material. 199 On the other 
hand, Professor Anne Schiff argues that whenever the 
decedent's wishes are unknown, a presumption against using 
gametes for posthumous reproduction should apply. 200 
Professor Schiff concludes that "[r]espect for a person's 
autonomy requires that an individual's body or body parts not 
be utilized without that individual's prior consent,"201 at least 
when not "justified by the compelling societal interest that 
exists ... in saving lives and alleviating suffering.'1202 
Given the academic debate, we cannot predict how courts 
and legislatures would approach the issue of gamete 
ownership when the late progenitor has failed to express any 
wishes as to the disposition of the gametes. It seems possible 
that given the general reluctance of the courts both in this 
country and abroad to approve of non-consented 
196. ld. 
197. ld. 
198. John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1064 
(1994) (emphasis added). 
199. See id. at 1047. 
200. Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of 
Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REv. 901, 945-51 (1997). 
201. ld. at 951. 
202. ld. at 947. 
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reproduction,203 the default position may well be that the 
surviving family members will be prevented from using the 
deceased relative's gametes. On the other hand, given that 
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (the "UAGA") reposes the 
authority to donate the organs with the surviving relatives 
(unless the decedent expressed wishes to the contrary),204 and 
permits the family to designate the recipient of those organs, 
the courts may permit family members to do as they desire. 
What is clear is that the courts are honoring the written 
agreements made when the genetic material was stored.205 
Thus, it is incumbent upon any clinic participating in the 
oncofertility program to develop a consent form where post­
mortem options are listed and explained to the consenting 
parties. The list of options should be developed in 
consultation with the clinic's attorney in light of the laws of 
the jurisdiction and in consultation with a bioethicist. To the 
extent possible, the views of the minor should also be solicited 
as they may inform (though they may not be determinative) 
any decision on the fate of the stored gametes should the 
minor die. 
G. Can Research on the Tissue Be Conducted and IfSo, What 
Steps Must the Researchers Take? 
Finally, we wish to consider the issue of research on the 
tissue that was excised to preserve the patient's fertility. The 
Northwestern University Oncofertility Project asks the 
patient who has decided to freeze her ovarian tissue to donate 
twenty percent of that tissue for research. Participation in 
the program, however, is not predicated on consent and 
women retain the option to refuse to donate. Thus far, all 
women have consented to donate a portion of their ovaries to 
research. Nonetheless, there is always a possibility that some 
women may feel such pressure to donate that their consent is 
not truly voluntary. What are the conditions that would 
ensure that any consent to research on the excised tissues has 
been freely given? 
203. See supra notes 182-85, 190-97 and accompanying text. 
204. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2, 8A U.LA 55 (2003 & Supp. 2008), 
available at http://www.anatomicalgiftact.orglDesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex= 
1&tabid=63. 
205. See, e.g. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 289 (Ct. App. 
1993); Mme. P. c. La Grave H6pital, supra note 195. 
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As previously discussed, competent adult patients are 
free to dispose of their tissues as they will, including donating 
parts of it for medical research. Thus, overall, the guidelines 
with respect to obtaining tissue for research would parallel 
general guidelines on seeking patient's directives on tissue 
disposition. There must, however, be additional precautions 
to ensure that the decision made by the patient is truly free 
from any coercive effects. In our view, the guidelines of the 
UAGA are a good starting point in designing procedures 
meant to eliminate coercion. 
Under the UAGA, a physician who attends the death of a 
donor is not permitted to be involved in the organ harvesting 
or transplantation, because this may create a conflict of 
interest for the physician.206 Though in the case of donating 
ovarian tissue the donor is not dead, a similar conflict may 
exist. The treating physician may have a conflict (or a 
perceived conflict) between focusing on treatment (whether 
oncological or fertility) and focusing on research. The 
physician may (at least theoretically) be swayed in his or her 
efforts depending on the patient's decision to donate or not 
donate parts of her tissue. Thus, taking the lead from the 
UAGA guidelines, it would be best if the donation were 
sought and obtained by personnel not involved with the 
treatment of the patient. Ideally, the treating physician 
should not know whether the patient chose to donate part of 
her tissue, lest his or her reaction to the decision affect the 
treatment provided to the patient. 
Furthermore, in seeking the patient's consent to 
donation, physicians should disclose any financial interest 
they may have in the project. As the California Supreme 
Court noted in Moore v. Regents of University ofCalifornia, in 
order for the consent to be truly free, a patient must rest 
assured that the treating physician is not improperly 
"influenced by a profit motive." 207 As the court observed: 
A physician who adds his own research interests to this 
balance may be tempted to order a scientifically useful 
procedure or test that offers marginal, or no, benefits to 
206. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 14(i), 8A U.L.A. 65 ("Neither the 
physician who attends the decedent at death nor the physician who determines 
the time of the decedent's death may participate in the procedures for removing 
or transplanting a part from the decedent."). 
207. Moore v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 792 P.2d 479,483 (Cal. 1990). 
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the patient. The possibility that an interest extraneous to 
the patient's health has affected the physician's judgment 
is something that a reasonable patient would want to 
know in deciding whether to consent to a proposed course 
of treatment. It is material to the patient's decision and, 
thus, a prerequisite to informed consent.20B 
It may be argued that in Moore, the court was concerned 
with procedures being done to the patient in vivo in order to 
bolster the research being done in vitro, and that the same 
concerns do not apply to oncofertility research that would 
involve tissue already voluntarily excised from the patient. 
Thus, the argument goes, the donation to research would not 
subject the patient to any additional risks, the researcher 
would not have a conflict of interest, and therefore the patient 
would not need to take that conflict into consideration in 
deciding whether to consent to research. While the 
observation that in vitro research does not necessarily involve 
any risk to the patient or conflict of interest for the researcher 
is correct, this argument does not apply to oncofertility 
research. For one thing, oncofertility patients, unlike the 
patient in Moore, do not have diseased organs, for which they 
have little use, excised. Rather, oncofertility patients 
preserve their tissues precisely because they expect to use 
them in the future. Thus, they may be disinclined to 
surrender any part of that tissue for fear that such surrender 
would diminish their chances of having a child.209 
Furthermore, the conflict of interest may still be present. The 
tissues are excised in order to preserve fertility and the 
ability to have children in the future; thus, the primary 
concern of physicians should be helping their patients 
conceive when and if they desire to do so. Pursuing their own 
research interests may conflict with physicians' responsibility 
to treat their patients' infertility. 
For the reasons outlined, it is critical that oncofertility 
programs adopt strong guidelines that ensure that patients 
can make truly informed and uncoerced decisions about 
whether or not to donate their tissues to research. 
208. Id. at 484 (footnote omitted). 
209. To be sure, many would consent to such a donation, out of the 
realization that but for research, the odds of achieving pregnancy would be 
miniscule. However, it is unexceptional to conclude that at least some women 
would prefer to preserve as much of their tissue as possible for reproductive use. 
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H. Are There Additional Concerns? 
This article is by no means an exhaustive treatise on the 
legal, moral, and ethical questions that surround the field of 
oncofertility. Questions of financing, religious objections, and 
access must be considered both by those who set up 
oncofertility programs and by those who decide on public 
policy concerning them. The Oncofertility Consortium 
continues to examine these issues and we expect that future 
scholarship by other members of the Consortium will expand 
the analysis we provide here. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The emerging field of oncofertility holds out new hope 
and possibilities for individuals whose fertility may be 
compromised by disease of reproductive organs or medical 
treatment. With further advances in the science, the patients 
will retain the ability to have children and to exercise their 
freedom to make reproductive decisions. However, as science 
develops, the scientists and physicians also acquire 
responsibilities to make sure that these advances are not 
used in an unethical or illegal manner. This article attempts 
to outline several difficult problems that oncofertility 
practitioners, patients, and patients' families are likely to 
face. We hope that our analysis will stimulate needed 
discussion in the laboratories, clinics, and at the bedside, and 
that through this ongoing dialogue, strong ethical and legal 
guidelines will emerge. 
